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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 on the earnings quality of public firms. I begin by discussing the history 
of the act and examining its provisions. I then explain the significance of earnings 
quality and how earnings quality can be measured. After gathering financial 
statement and earnings quality data, I used SAS to compare quality of earnings 
before and after 2002. From the results, I concluded that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 did in fact significantly improve earnings quality.  
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Introduction 
In the early 2000s, a series of financial scandals came to the attention of the 
public. The most notable of these were the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom. 
Executives contributed to the collapse of their companies by falsifying information 
for personal gain or hiding the evidence if their company was struggling. 
Accounting firms acted only in the interests of the companies they audited, profiting 
from this relationship at the expense of shareholders (Holt, 2008). Investors had 
little to no warning of these corporate bankruptcies and lost hundreds of billions of 
dollars because of it. The public was outraged and investors began to lose confidence 
in the market (Jahmani, 2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, also known as 
SOX, was passed in order to combat this issue.  
The goals of SOX included protecting and providing confidence to investors, 
deterring and punishing fraudulent financial reporting practices, and improving the 
ethical standards and internal controls of companies (Holt, 2008). SOX was also 
intended to make financial statements more transparent and understandable and to 
promote accountability by senior executives. One result of SOX, if the act was 
effective, would be improved earnings quality of public firms. Earnings quality is a 
function of both the financial performance of a company and how its accounting 
system measures performance. It is an important aspect to consider because it 
affects whether or not companies' reported earnings are informative about their 
financial performance (Dechow, 2010).  
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In order to determine the effect SOX had on earnings quality, I gathered 
financial statement and earnings quality data for a set of publicly traded 
companies. After synthesizing and analyzing this data, I was able to determine 
what measures of earnings quality changed significantly after SOX was passed. 
From the results of my research, I concluded that SOX had a positive impact on 
earnings quality.  
Background 
I. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Successfully monitoring internal controls and enforcing ethical accounting 
problems had been an issue for decades prior to SOX. The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977 (FCPA) monitored internal controls and accounting practices; this law 
applied to all companies filing with the SEC. Unfortunately, FCPA was not 
successful in curbing fraud, as evidenced by the continued financial scandals and 
unanticipated bankruptcies. The scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other 
companies spurred the creation of SOX by showing the need for legislative reform. 
While FCPA addressed the bribery of foreign officials and accounting transparency, 
SOX targeted domestic fraud directly. SOX improved on FCPA by imposing 
additional disclosure requirements about a company's internal controls and 
financial reporting practices, as well as placing further criminal penalties on 
fraudulent disclosure (Ge & McVay, 2005). 
SOX is widely considered to be the most significant piece of financial 
legislation since the 1930s regulation of securities markets (Holt, 2008). By bringing 
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governmental oversight into the accounting industry, the act aimed to expose 
corruption, reduce financial statement fraud, and restore public confidence in the 
market. While some companies saw compliance with the new law as costly, SOX 
generally required companies to do things they should have already been doing. 
Other companies believed that SOX compliance could actually help them, if utilized 
as a management tool (U.S. House, 2004). 
SOX is divided into 11 chapters, each with a different focus. While I will 
touch on all of them, sections 4, 8, 9, and 11 are particularly significant. These 
chapters specifically were intended to impact companies in ways that would 
improve earnings quality. When examining the impact of SOX on earnings quality, 
it is the success of the rules set forth in these chapters that are in question.  
The first chapter, denoted as Title I, established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). PCAOB became responsible for developing 
professional standards of auditing and ethics, overseeing the audit process of public 
companies, and enforcing compliance with SOX and other regulations. Title II 
mandates that accounting firms cannot simultaneously provide both audit and non-
audit services to a company. The purpose of this is to maintain independence 
between auditors and the companies for which they prepare reports. Title III 
outlines the responsibilities of public company audit committees. It also states that 
chief executive officers and chief financial officers may have to forfeit certain 
bonuses if their company is found noncompliant with financial reporting 
requirements due to misconduct. 
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The motivation behind Title IV is to improve the accuracy of financial 
disclosures. It states that all financial reports must follow generally accepted 
accounting principles. It also prohibits firms from maintaining or extending credit 
to give personal loans to any director or executive officer. Rules pertaining to codes 
of ethics are included in this chapter as well. Each firm is obligated to disclose 
whether or not it has a code of ethics for its senior financial officers and explain why 
if it does not. Section 404 presented a distinct challenge for firms to comply with. It 
requires that each annual report contain an internal control report. The report must 
state that management is responsible for establishing internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting; it must also assess the effectiveness of the 
internal control structure and procedures as of the end of the most recent fiscal 
year. Title V discusses the conflicts of interest that can arise when analysts are 
recommending equity securities. The rules in this chapter are meant to give 
investors more confidence in the objectivity of research reports. 
The authority and resources of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) are discussed in Title VI. The SEC has the authority to censure or deny any 
person from appearing or practicing before it, but the person must first be given 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Commission can also prohibit any 
person from participating in an offering of penny stock if court proceedings 
determined misconduct. Any person may be barred or suspended from association 
with a broker or dealer or from engaging in the business of securities, insurance, or 
banking; this action would be taken after fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive 
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conduct is found. This chapter also appropriated funds for the functions and duties 
of the SEC, including security enhancements, additional professional support, and 
information technology. Title VII discusses studies to be conducted by the 
Comptroller General and the related reports that should be generated. Studies 
mentioned include an examination of consolidations of public accounting firms and 
an analysis of the role of credit rating agencies in the function of securities markets. 
Criminal fraud accountability is the focus of Title VIII. It first describes the 
criminal penalties for altering, falsifying, or destroying corporate records. The next 
topic covered is securities fraud. Any debts incurred in connection with violation of 
Federal securities laws will be nondischargeable, as will any debt incurred through 
common law fraud in connection with the sale or purchase of a security. The statute 
of limitations on securities fraud is 2 years after the discovery of the violation or 5 
years after the violation itself. Title VIII also directed the United States Sentencing 
Commission to review and amend the sentencing guidelines for fraud and 
obstruction of justice. The consequences should be sufficient to deter and punish 
these activities. Whistleblowers are given protection under this chapter. No 
company can threaten, suspend, demote, or discharge an employee for assisting 
with an investigation or providing information about violations of SEC regulations. 
Any person who is discharged under these circumstances can file a complaint with 
the Secretary of Labor and may receive compensation for damages. 
Title IX increases the penalties for white-collar crime. Conspiracy or attempt 
to commit any of the criminal fraud offenses mentioned is subject to the same 
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penalties as commission of the act itself. Offenses included are mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. It 
states that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be reviewed to more 
effectively deter and punish fraud. Guidelines should also account for any 
additional circumstances that might justify exceptions to a sentencing range. A 
written statement by the issuing company’s chief executive officer or chief financial 
officer must accompany all reports containing financial statements. This statement 
must certify that the report accurately presents the financial condition of the 
company and fully complies with all requirements. This is complemented by Title X, 
which simply states that a company’s federal income tax return should be signed by 
the chief executive officer of the firm. 
The next and final section of SOX is Title XI, which deals with corporate 
fraud accountability. Anyone found obstructing or influencing an official proceeding 
will be subject to a fine and up to 20 years imprisonment. This includes concealing, 
altering, or destroying records with the purpose of impairing the document's use in 
an official proceeding. Title XI also asserts that the SEC can prohibit any person 
form serving as an officer or director for violating regulations or other conduct unfit 
for an officer or director. It also amended section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, increasing the criminal penalties (H.R. 3763). 
Implementing SOX was initially costly for companies; the most expensive 
aspect was installing and maintaining an Internal Control System. There was also 
a significant jump in auditing fees. There were theories that United States capital 
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markets would become somewhat uncompetitive after SOX. In the beginning, many 
foreign companies delisted from U.S. exchanges, and more U.S. corporations listed 
overseas to avoid compliance costs. However, soon other countries adopted their 
own versions of SOX, and regulations began to converge internationally. 
Corporations also realized the benefits of improving internal controls. Some of these 
positive effects include increased operating efficiency, increased investor liquidity, 
decreased employee theft, and reduced likelihood of employee redundancy (Holt, 
2008). 
II. Quality of Earnings 
 Earnings quality is defined as the likelihood that a firm can sustain current 
earnings in the future (Beneish, 2002). Having high quality of earnings is important 
to reducing uncertainty in the market and improving capital market efficiency. It 
reveals the current financial state of firms while providing accurate inputs for 
predictions about the future (Ewert, 2011). Quality of earnings is complex to 
determine because it is not directly observable. Various models have been developed 
to measure earnings quality, using variables that are directly observable as a proxy. 
One such model is the Beneish M-Score Model, which uses financial ratios to detect 
earnings manipulation.  
Analysis 
I. Data  
In order to determine whether or not SOX improved earnings quality, I 
analyzed two sets of data. From the Compustat database, I used Fundamentals 
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Annual data from 1995 to 2004. This contained balance sheet, income statement, 
and cash flow statement data from all of the companies in the Compustat database. 
I also used earnings quality data on publicly traded companies from 1981 to 2014. 
This contained 63 variables, including Beneish Model variables: Days’ Sales in 
Receivables (DSRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Sales 
Growth Index (SGI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), Sales, General, and Administrative 
Expenses Index (SGAI), Leverage Index (LVGI), Total Accruals to Total Assets 
Index (TATA), Beneish Model Quality Score (M-Score). These variables were used to 
determine the quality of earnings. The definition and significance of each of these 
variables can be found in Table 1. 
II. Methodology 
Using SAS, I combined the Compustat Fundamentals Annual data and 
earnings quality data. I then created a dummy variable in the combined data set to 
differentiate between company data from before SOX was passed, and data from 
after SOX. This dummy variable took on the value of zero if the observation 
occurred before 2002 and a value of one if the observation occurred after 2002. Data 
from 2002 itself was not included to control for activity occurring directly before and 
after the act was passed that may not be representative of overall trends. After 
performing a t-test on the nine Beneish Model variables, I was able to determine if 
earnings quality significantly changed after SOX was implemented.  
Each of the variables found to be significant were then tested further in SAS 
with regression analysis.  In this model, I included 4 new variables to control for 
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firm-level differences: firm size, market-to-book, earnings yield, and leverage. The 
definition and significance of each of these variables can be found in Table 2. From 
these results, I was able to conclude specifically in what ways SOX affected 
earnings quality, as well as infer why these changes may have occurred. For 
variables with a negative relationship to earnings quality, a significant decrease 
after 2002 supports the hypothesis that earnings quality improved after SOX. For 
variables with a positive relationship, a significant increase after 2002 supports the 
hypothesis that earnings quality improved after SOX. 
Results 
The t-test compared the average of each variable before 2002 with the 
respective average after 2002. The t value was created by subtracting the post-SOX 
value from the pre-SOX value then dividing by the standard error. A positive t 
value indicates a decrease in the variable after SOX, while a negative t value 
indicates an increase in the variable after SOX. The t value was used to determine 
if a change was statistically significant. The following data was collected: 
 DSRI GMI AQI SGI DEPI SGAI LVGI TATA M-
Score 
Mean 
Before 
SOX 
1.5221 5.7985 -1.7669 4.0055 1.1442 1.3167 2.3249 -0.4749 -0.8715 
Mean 
After 
SOX 
1.4312 2.3642 -1.2779 2.0882 1.0960 1.1779 1.2379 0.0075 -0.6024 
t Value 0.85 0.99 -0.62 4.35 2.32 2.43 1.82 -2.50 -0.14 
There was not a significant difference in Days' Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI) after SOX. 
There was not a significant difference in Gross Margin Index (GMI) after SOX. 
There was not a significant difference in Asset Quality Index (AQI) after SOX. 
There was a significant difference in Sales Growth Index (SGI) after SOX. 
There was a significant difference in Depreciation Index (DEPI) after SOX. 
There was a significant difference in Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI) 
after SOX. 
There was not a significant difference in Leverage Index (LVGI) after SOX. 
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There was a significant difference in Total Accruals to Total Assets Index (TATA) after SOX. 
There was not a significant difference in Beneish Model Quality Score (M-Score) after SOX. 
I then used SAS to regress SGI, DEPI, SGAI, and TATA on the dummy 
variable and the control variables. The outcome was as follows: 
 SGI DEPI SGAI TATA 
t Value -2.37 -1.11 -1.65 1.43 
There was a significant difference in Sales Growth Index (SGI) after SOX. 
There was a not significant difference in Depreciation Index (DEPI) after SOX. 
There was a significant difference in Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI) 
after SOX. 
There was a not significant difference in Total Accruals to Total Assets Index (TATA) after SOX. 
 
Discussion and Inferences 
DEPI decreased after SOX was passed, but this difference was only 
significant under the t-test. DEPI compares a firm’s depreciation expense and 
property, plant, and equipment to those of the previous year. This represents the 
rate at which assets are being depreciated. A higher DEPI indicates that a firm may 
be overstating the useful lives of its property, plant, and equipment. This would in 
turn cause income to be overstated. The decrease observed in DEPI is a positive 
signal. It means that property, plant, and equipment is being depreciated at a more 
accurate rate thus income is more accurately reported. It is likely that the internal 
control provisions in SOX contributed to this decrease despite the fact that the 
change was not statistically significant under regression. 
TATA increased after SOX was passed, and this change was also only 
significant under the t-test. TATA represents a ratio of a firm’s total accruals to 
total assets. This ratio should be fairly consistent unless there are major changes 
occurring within the firm. Accruals are conventionally a commonly altered figure in 
fraudulent disclosures. Therefore, there is a correlation between high accruals and 
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financial statement manipulation. A high TATA could indicate that a firm is 
overstating profit by relying on uncollected revenue. The fact that TATA increased 
after 2002 shows that SOX was not effective in improving this aspect of earnings 
quality. This may be due to the fact that it is more difficult to detect fraud 
perpetrated in this manner, and there is no provision in SOX specifically addressing 
the appropriate use of accruals. 
From the results of the regression, I concluded that the passage of SOX 
contributed to a statistically significant decrease in both SGI and SGAI. SGI 
represents the growth rate of sales as compared to the previous year. Growing firms 
are more likely to commit fraud because of the pressure to sustain the appearance 
of high growth even if growth has slowed. However, it is important to note that the 
presence of high growth rates does not itself indicate fraudulent activity. The 
decrease in SGI shows that after 2002, there were lower growth rates reported. 
While this could mean that there was less growth in sales after 2002, it more likely 
means that there were less falsely inflated growth figures published due to the 
passage of SOX. The increased criminal penalties for committing fraud suppressed 
firms’ desires to keep up with shareholder expectations even if this meant 
sacrificing the accuracy of financial disclosures. The decrease in SGI shows that 
SOX was effective in decreasing fraudulent reporting, thus improving earnings 
quality. 
SGAI measures how the ratio of a firm’s sales, general, and administrative 
expenses to sales compares to this ratio in the previous year. Increases in sales are 
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generally proportionate to increases in expenses. If sales are increasing faster than 
expenses, this could indicate that revenues are overstated. This would be conveyed 
by a high SGAI. The decrease in SGAI after 2002 means that sales became more 
proportionate to sales, general, and administrative expenses. Revenues became less 
overstated or more correctly stated due to the provisions in SOX concerning internal 
controls. This shows that SOX was effective in increasing the accuracy of financial 
statements, thus improving earnings quality. 
Conclusion 
After the series of financial scandals exposed in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the public could no longer rely on a firm’s financial statements to capture its true 
economic condition. The passage of SOX in 2002 brought hope for a future with less 
fraudulent activity and restored investor confidence. SOX was not the first law in 
the United States to monitor internal controls and accounting practices, but it 
brought momentous change to public companies. Its impact extended even further 
when some non-public firms voluntarily adopted provisions of SOX, and other 
countries around the world were inspired to create their own version of the act. 
One main objective of SOX was to improve the accuracy of financial 
disclosures, improving earnings quality. The ability of a firm to have high quality of 
earnings is arguably more important than the creation of high earnings itself. 
Without an accounting system that accurately measures performance, earnings are 
neither controllable nor sustainable. The intentions of SOX were promising, but 
enacting new regulations would have been pointless if the law was not effective. 
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After identifying variables that reflect earnings quality, I was able to 
examine those variables pre- and post-SOX in order to determine the act's 
effectiveness. From nine measures of earnings quality, a t-test found a significant 
change in four of the variables after SOX was passed: SGI, DEPI, SGAI, and TATA. 
Regression analysis controlling for firm differences determined a significance in 
only two variables: SGI and SGAI. The decreases in SGI and SGAI that occurred 
after SOX support the hypothesis that the act was effective at improving the quality 
of earnings in public companies. Based on the meaning of these variables, the 
provisions of SOX that improved the accuracy of financial disclosures were likely 
the increased criminal penalties for falsifying corporate records and the push for 
effective internal controls. 
Analyzing public companies a few years after SOX was enacted would not 
have provided an accurate look at the law's effectiveness. This is especially true 
since it took some companies a few years to comply. Now over a decade has passed, 
and the provisions of SOX are well assimilated into the practices of public 
companies. Understanding how and why SOX was effective, and in what aspects it 
was ineffective, has lasting implications. This exposes parts of SOX that could be 
strengthened and new issues that should be covered in future regulatory laws. This 
knowledge will help lawmakers to maintain the progress that SOX has already 
made in improving earnings quality and bring further improvement in years to 
come. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Beneish Model Variables 
Variable Definition  Significance 
DSRI 
 
 
Disproportionate 
increases in this 
ratio suggests that 
earnings are 
overstated 
GMI 
 
Firms with falling 
gross margins have 
poor prospects and 
thus are more likely 
to manipulate 
earnings  
AQI 
 
If greater than 1, 
indicates potential 
increase in cost 
deferral 
SGI 
 
Growth firms have 
greater incentives to 
manipulate earnings 
DEPI 
 
If greater than 1, 
indicates possibility 
of upward revision of 
assets useful lives to 
increase reported 
earnings 
SGAI 
 
Disproportionate 
increase in sales is 
negative signal about 
future, thus firm 
more likely to 
manipulate earnings 
LVGI 
 
Debt covenants are 
an incentive to 
manipulate earnings 
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TATA 
  
Accruals measures 
the extent to which 
managers make 
discretionary 
accounting choices to 
alter earnings 
M-Score -4.84 + (0.92*DSRI) + (0.528*GMI) + (0.404*AQI) 
+ (0.892*SGI) + (0.115*DEPI) - (0.172*SGAI) + 
(4.679*TATA) - (0.327*LVGI) 
An M-Score greater 
than -2.22 is an 
indication of 
financial statement 
manipulation 
Note: All variables are indicators of earnings manipulation. Any change in 
the above variables signaling an increase in earnings manipulation was 
interpreted as also indicating a decrease in earnings quality. 
Table 2: Control Variables 
Variable Definition Significance 
Firm Size 
 
Negative 
relationship 
between size 
and earnings 
quality 
Market-to-
Book Ratio 
  Firms with high 
market-to-book 
ratios tend to 
earn 
subsequently 
lower returns 
Earnings 
Yield  
Firms with low 
P/E ratios tend 
to outperform 
firms with high 
P/E ratios  
Leverage 
 
Controls for 
differences in 
financial risk 
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Figure 1: SAS Model 
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